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ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS 
Does Choice of Eyewitness Research Materials Influence Findings? 
By 
Jillian Morgan Kenchel 
Master of Arts in Social Ecology 
University of California, Irvine, 2019 
Professor Elizabeth F. Loftus, Chair 
 
The misinformation effect refers to memory distortion following exposure to inaccurate 
post-event information. The present study sought to take a critical look at the materials used in 
eyewitness memory research through the lens of this misinformation effect. One criticism of 
applying research on eyewitness memory to the real-world legal system is that many studies rely 
on pallid materials. Research on the misinformation effect usually uses a video or slideshow to 
expose participants to a crime. While videos provide a more realistic scenario with the moving 
picture, slideshows are easier to manipulate. The present study sought to explore whether these 
two modes of stimuli, differing in realism, produce similar effects for participants in response to 
post-event misinformation. Participants were randomly assigned to view the same crime via a 
video or slideshow, and then to be exposed to post-event information about the crime that was 
either misinformation or consistent information. Finally, all participants took a memory test 
which tested their memory for details of the crime. Results showed that participants who viewed 
the crime via video or slideshow did not significantly differ in susceptibility to post-event 
misinformation. The relationship between eyewitness confidence and accuracy was also 
examined. The need for more critical consideration of the stimuli used in research is discussed.
 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 After a crime is committed, witnesses are frequently questioned about the details of the 
crime. These witness interviews may happen immediately or after a short delay (perhaps a few 
days, or sometimes even longer). Especially when there is a delay, opportunities can arise for 
witnesses to be exposed to post-event information that may influence their memories. This 
information may come in the form of media, talking with co-witnesses, or investigators 
themselves. Post-event information is especially troubling when the witness is exposed to 
incorrect details, as this misinformation can become incorporated into a witness’s memory and 
alter that memory. This memory distortion due to exposure to incorrect information is known as 
the “misinformation effect” (Zaragoza, Belli, & Payment, 2007; Frenda, Nichols, & Loftus, 
2011). The misinformation effect is often used as a demonstration of the malleability of 
eyewitness memory. 
Throughout the many years of research on the misinformation effect, the to-be-
remembered event is often presented to participants in the form of a video or a slideshow. The 
present research seeks to investigate whether the form of stimulus presented at encoding affects 
subsequent memory performance, particularly in the misinformation paradigm. 
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CHAPTER 1: MISINFORMATION AND EYEWITNESS RESEARCH 
MATERIALS 
The Misinformation Effect 
Ample research has demonstrated the danger of the misinformation effect in eyewitness 
research. In one early study, Loftus (1975) showed the malleability of memory by presenting 
participants a video of a car speeding down the road. Then, half of the participants were asked 
the misleading question, “How fast was the white sports car going when it passed the barn while 
traveling along the country road?” and the other half were asked, “How fast was the white sports 
car going while traveling along the country road?” This misinformation here is the presence of 
the barn, as there was in fact no barn in the video. After a week retention interval, participants 
were asked, “Did you see a barn?” Of those asked the question containing the misinformation, 
17% reported seeing a barn, while only 3% of those asked the neutral question reported seeing a 
barn. This study demonstrated the ease of implanting misinformation in memory. The mere 
suggestion of the presence of a barn in the question resulted in that information being 
incorporated into participants’ memories. This misinformation effect has been replicated over 
and over, using a variety of methods to insert misinformation such as embedding misinformation 
in post-event narratives (Echterhoff, Groll, & Hirst, 2007), post-event questions (Forgas, Laham, 
& Vargas, 2005), and through discussion with co- witnesses (Jack, Zydervelt, & Zajac, 2014; 
Zajac, Dickson, Munn, & O’Neill, 2016).   
Misinformation Study Materials  
The misinformation effect is robust, having been found in a variety of contexts and with 
differing stimuli (for a review, see Loftus, 2005; Frenda et al., 2011). Misinformation research in 
the eyewitness context usually involves three steps: viewing a crime, exposure to post-event 
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misinformation, and then testing. When showing participants the target event, researchers 
commonly use videos or slideshows to depict the crime, with each stimulus having its own 
drawbacks (Takarangi, Parker, & Garry, 2006). Videos seem to provide a more realistic scenario, 
with the moving picture simulating “real time,” and many researchers use this method (Loftus, 
1975; Echterhoff et al., 2007; Foster, Huthwaite, Yesberg, Garry, & Loftus, 2012; Blank, Ost, 
Davies, Jones, Lambert, & Salmon, 2013). However, videos present difficulties in the ability for 
experimenters to manipulate variables of interest, such as having different versions of the event 
that vary exposure time or counterbalance items. To remedy this issue, some researchers use 
slideshows to depict the crime, allowing the researcher to have more control over these variables 
(McCloskey & Zaragoza, 1985; Assefi & Garry, 2003; Forgas et al., 2005; Higham, Blank, & 
Luna, 2017). However, while slideshows are easier to make, they provide less realism in 
representing real-world events.  
One criticism of applying laboratory studies to the real-world legal system is that the 
ecology of the laboratory is often different from that of the real-world eyewitness context. Flowe, 
Carline, and Karoglu (2018) examined this difference, coining the term “eyewitness ecology” to 
refer to the environmental context in which a crime is witnessed. In reviewing laboratory studies 
on eyewitness identification compared to a sample of archival felony cases, Flowe and 
colleagues found large differences in the eyewitness ecology, such as differences in the 
prevalence of violence or in retention interval length. The concern presented is that many of 
these studies of eyewitness identification are not generalizable to the real legal context. It is 
possible that real world eyewitnesses may not behave the same way in response to simplified 
laboratory stimuli as they would in response to a crime in the real world.  
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This criticism has been especially directed at the use of slideshows to depict a crime. For 
example, Takarangi et al. (2006) portray using slideshows as an “unsatisfying” way to capture 
real events because a slideshow lacks the richness provided by full motion action. It is possible 
that real world eyewitnesses may not behave the same way in response to a slideshow as they 
would in response to a crime in the real world. Lending support to this notion is the work of 
Snow, Skiba, Coleman, and Berryhill (2014), who investigated memory for real objects in 
comparison to photographs and sketches of those objects. The results showed that both recall and 
recognition memory was better for the real objects than for both the photographs and the 
sketches. One possible contributing factor for these results is that the size and distance of real 
objects is unambiguous to the observer, while in contrast these features may be more ambiguous 
in a two-dimensional photograph. This study introduces the possibility that a slideshow and a 
video may also be encoded differently, as a video may offer more information about size and 
relational distance than a still slide can offer. Therefore, there may be differential memory 
performance, and hence more susceptibility to incorporating misinformation into memory, 
depending on the stimulus presented at encoding. 
On the other hand, an earlier study found no difference in memory performance when a 
target face was encoded either through a live presentation or a static image presentation 
(Megreya & Burton, 2008). The purpose of this particular study was to discern memory 
performance for unfamiliar faces at baseline, when memory for an event is not required. In this 
study, participants viewed a target person either live or in a photograph, with exposure time held 
constant, and then immediately completed an identification procedure. The results showed that 
there was no difference in memory performance between the live and photograph conditions. 
While the findings here suggest that memory performance does not depend on the materials 
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presented for encoding (i.e., a live person or a photograph), the study intentionally removed 
many of the difficulties present in an eyewitness setting, such as a long retention interval or poor 
viewing conditions. Additionally, this study focused specifically on memory for faces, which 
may operate differently than memory for events or objects (Elbich, Molenaar, & Scherf, 2019). 
This study leaves uncertainty regarding whether these same null results may be found when 
memory performance is tested for objects rather than faces. 
Confidence and Accuracy Relationship  
Additionally, it is common in police procedures for the witness to be asked to report their 
level of confidence in their memory for various aspects of the crime. This is especially true when 
they try to identify the perpetrator of the crime. There is an abundance of research exploring the 
relationship between eyewitness confidence and eyewitness accuracy, specifically in the context 
of eyewitness identification (e.g., after a witness picks out the perpetrator from a lineup). In this 
context, there is much debate around the relationship between confidence and accuracy 
(hereafter, CA), but generally, in pristine circumstances, there may be a strong CA relationship 
(for an overview of this research, see Wells & Wixted, 2017). However, the eyewitness CA 
relationship is seldom explored outside the context of eyewitness identification. This leaves 
room for investigation of this relationship for details of the crime.  
Further, there is reason to believe that the CA relationship is susceptible to changes in 
study materials. The optimality hypothesis, suggested by Deffenbacher in 1980, proposes that the 
degree of optimality of conditions during encoding, retention, and retrieval stages of memory 
predicts the strength of the CA relationship. This hypothesis is used to explain the widely 
varying CA correlation results across several studies (Sporer, Penrod, Read, & Cutler, 1995). 
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The varying degree of optimality in study materials may then influence the subsequent 
relationship between confidence and accuracy. 
The Present Study 
The present study seeks to investigate how the misinformation effect may vary between 
two modes of stimuli: videos and slideshows. This study is the first to directly compare memory 
performance for these two stimuli with specially created materials that hold constant the target 
event. A further goal was to explore the CA relationship outside of the domain of eyewitness 
identification, examining the strength of the relationship for memory for crime details (as 
opposed to human faces which had been done in past research).    
If the study falls in line with the study by Snow and colleagues (2014), which found 
better memory performance for real objects in comparison to photographed objects, the 
misinformation effect should be larger for participants who viewed the slideshow rather than 
video. Because the video is higher in realism, it will result in better memory performance and 
therefore less misinformation endorsement.  
There is a competing prediction, however, which postulates that the misinformation 
effect will be larger for participants who view the video. This prediction stems from the nature of 
the stimulus: a video presents more distracting information because of the moving picture, while 
a slideshow allows a person to scan the entire slide before moving on to the next. Therefore, 
there may be more attention paid toward the target items in the slideshow, making it less likely 
that those who view the slideshow will endorse misinformation regarding those items. 
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CHAPTER 2: METHODOLOGY 
Participants 
 Participants were undergraduates at the University of California, Irvine who completed 
the study in exchange for course credit. Of the 280 participants who completed the study, 13 
were removed for technical issues and 23 were removed for having seen the content before, 
leaving a final sample of 244 (78% female). The racial composition of the sample was consistent 
with that of the undergraduate institution, with the majority being Asian (42%), Hispanic/Latino 
(37%), or Caucasian (13%), and the remaining 8% identifying as another race. Participant age 
ranged from 18-28 with a mean age of 20. 
Design and Materials 
 Participants were randomly assigned to one of four conditions in a 2 (Stimulus: video, 
slideshow) x 2 (Post-event information (PEI): misinformation, consistent information) between-
subjects design.  
Video and slideshow. The present study used materials from an episode of National 
Geographic’s Brain Games (Season 1, Episode 3). The study used a section of this episode 
portraying a three-perpetrator crime occurring in a park. The video shows a man presenting card 
tricks to a crowd of people in a large park. The camera then scans over to a woman, the first 
perpetrator, yelling at a tourist to distract him. A second, male perpetrator then runs up to the 
victim’s bag and steals his wallet. The second perpetrator hands off the wallet to a third, male 
perpetrator who runs off with the wallet. The first and second perpetrators then run in separate 
directions. The entire video lasts about 45 seconds. 
 A slideshow was created from the video, portraying the same events via still pictures 
taken from the video. Each slide was shown for approximately two seconds. The slideshow was 
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matched for length of time of the video.  For this study, both the video and slideshow were 
presented without sound.     
 Post-event memory test. Post-event misinformation was presented through misleading 
questions in a post-event memory test. In the consistent information test, all questions contained 
information consistent with the events portrayed. In the misinformation test, two questions were 
manipulated to contain post-event misinformation. The two misleading questions suggested that 
the woman perpetrator wore a red coat, when in fact it was grey, and that the stolen item was a 
camera, when in fact it was a wallet. Both tests then later questioned participants on the target 
information (i.e., coat color and stolen item). For example, participants in the consistent 
information condition saw the question, “Think about the woman in the grey coat who was 
screaming at the man, what color hair did she have?”, while participants in the misinformation 
condition saw the question, “Think about the woman in the red coat who was screaming at the 
man, what color hair did she have?” Later, all participants were asked, “What color was the coat 
of the woman who was screaming at the victim?” 
 Prior to the post-event memory test, participants were instructed to answer the questions 
based on what they remember seeing in the event. The memory test included 16 multiple choice 
questions with either two or four answer options per question. Each question was accompanied 
by the question, “How confident are you that your answer is correct?” with a sliding scale from 0 
to 100 and 10-point increment anchors on top. 
 Stimuli preference questions. Participants were asked questions about their preferences 
for viewing the crime via slideshow or video. These questions were asked specifically about the 
stimulus that participants saw. For example, participants who viewed the slideshow were asked, 
“If I saw the event in the form of a video, I would have remembered more details” while 
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participants who viewed the video were asked the same question, but about slideshows. This 
questionnaire included seven questions. Some questions asked about how realistic, enjoyable, 
interesting, and clear the slideshow or video was. The other questions asked if the other form of 
stimulus could convey more information and if the participant would have paid more attention to 
and remembered more details from the other form of stimulus.  
Procedure 
 After obtaining informed consent, participants were randomly assigned to stimulus 
condition, either viewing the video or the slideshow. Participants were not informed that they 
would be later tested on their memory to better approximate real-world scenarios where 
eyewitnesses are not aware that they may be questioned about the crime. After viewing either the 
video or slideshow, participants all performed the same filler tasks. These tasks included the 
Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability scale (Crowne & Marlowe, 1960) and the Need for 
Cognition scale (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982). These tasks served two purposes: first, they provided 
consistency with the supposed purpose of the study, and, second, they provided a short retention 
interval between the target event and the memory test. After completing the filler tasks, 
participants then completed the post-event memory test. Participants were randomly assigned to 
receive either the misinformation test or the consistent information test. Afterwards, participants 
completed questions asking about their preferences for viewing the crime via slideshow or video. 
Participants then filled out questions collecting demographic information.  
Finally, participants went through a funneled debriefing which gave them an opportunity 
to discuss the misinformation. The debriefing questions start with general questions about the 
purpose of the study (i.e., “What do you think the study was about?”), and then begin to ask 
about the post-event memory test (e.g., “Think back to the questions about the crime you viewed 
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at the beginning of the study. Did you find anything strange about those questions?”). These 
questions were presented with an open text box. The questions aimed to find participants who 
detected the misinformation. Finally, participants were fully debriefed.  
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CHAPTER 3: RESULTS 
Misinformation Endorsement 
 Misinformation endorsement (ME) was coded dichotomously for each of the two target 
items (coat color and stolen item) based on choosing the misinformation answer (coded as 
misinformation endorsement) or choosing any other answer. The percent of participants in each 
condition who endorsed the misinformation items are presented in Figures 1a and 1b. 
Participants in the misinformation condition endorsed the misinformation items (i.e., red coat, 
camera) significantly more than participants in the consistent information condition. However, 
ME did not differ between participants who viewed the video and participants who viewed the 
slideshow.  
A mixed-effects logistic regression analyzed PEI condition and stimulus condition on ME 
across both target questions. ME was higher for participants in the misinformation condition 
(60% of participants for the coat color, 45% for the stolen item) in contrast to the consistent 
information condition (22% for the coat color, 2% for the stolen item; OR = 10.97, 95% CI 
[5.35, 22.48], p < .001). That is, the odds of participants in the misinformation condition 
endorsing the misinformation items were 10.97 times more likely than participants in the 
consistent information condition. Stimulus condition and the interaction between PEI condition 
and stimulus condition were not significant (OR = 2.14, 95% CI [.97, 4.70], p = .059; OR = .61, 
95% CI [.24, 1.58], p = .312, respectively). However, as seen in Figures 1a and 1b, the data do 
show a trend toward the video condition being associated with higher ME than the slideshow 
condition. 
Accuracy 
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 Accuracy was assessed by excluding the two target questions due to the presence of 
misinformation influencing accuracy in those questions. Overall accuracy was created through 
coding each memory test question for accuracy and then averaging across 13 memory test 
questions. One question about the color of the woman’s hair was excluded from this analysis 
because two answers (e.g., “black” and “brown”) were both chosen frequently and both answers 
were feasible. Average accuracy is presented in Figure 2, showing that accuracy for these items 
was about 60% correct and did not differ based upon which stimulus participants viewed. There 
was no significant difference in accuracy between stimulus conditions, t (242) = -.27, p = .79, d 
= -.034. 
Confidence 
 Confidence was assessed through taking the average confidence level expressed across 
all of the memory test items. The first analysis excluded the target items to get a sense of the 
confidence level for items that were not affected by misinformation and the second analysis 
included the target items. As seen in Figure 3, confidence levels with and without the target 
items were not significantly different based on which stimulus participants viewed. There was no 
significant difference in average confidence level expressed for participants who viewed the 
slideshow in comparison to participants who viewed the video, t (240) = .26, p = .80, d = .03. In 
the second analysis, which included the target items, there was also no significant difference in 
confidence expressed between participants who saw the slideshow in contrast to those who saw 
the video, t (240) = .50, p = .62, d = .06. Hence, stimulus condition did not influence how 
confident participants are that they are remembering the event correctly.  
 Confidence for each target question was also assessed, parsing apart confidence by 
answers on each question (see Figures 4a and 4b). The coat color question showed the “signature 
 13 
pattern” of the misinformation effect, with participants endorsing the misinformation item with 
high confidence. The stolen item question, however, did not show this same pattern, with 
participants who answered correctly showing higher confidence. A 2 (PEI: misinformation, 
consistent) x 2 (Answer: misinformation, consistent, filler) ANOVA analyzed confidence for 
each target item. For the coat color question, there was a significant main effect of PEI condition, 
F (1, 238) = 10.49, p = .0014, η2 = .04, so that participants in the misinformation condition were 
significantly more confident in their answers than participants in the consistent information 
condition. There was also a significant main effect of answer, F (1, 238) = 4.96, p = .0077, η2 = 
.04. A post-hoc Tukey test revealed that participants who chose one of the filler answers were 
significantly less confident (M = 37%) than participants who chose the correct answer (M = 54%, 
t = -3.04, p = .007) or the misinformation answer (M = 44%, t = -2.76, p = .017). The interaction 
was not significant. For the stolen item question, there was a significant main effect of answer, F 
(1, 238) = 7.68, p = .0006, η2 = .06. A post-hoc Tukey test revealed that participants who 
answered correctly were significantly more confident (M = 69%) than participants who chose the 
misinformation item (M = 38%, t = -2.51, p = .034) or the filler item (M = 39%, t = -3.16, p = 
.005). Neither the main effect for PEI condition nor the interaction was significant.  
Confidence and Accuracy (CA) Relationship  
 Overall CA relationship. To assess the relationship between confidence and accuracy, 
overall confidence was created by averaging confidence across each question in the memory test. 
Using this new overall confidence variable and the previously explained overall accuracy 
variable, we conducted a Pearson correlation between confidence and accuracy. There was a 
moderate, positive correlation between confidence and accuracy, which was significant, r = .416, 
p < .001. Another Pearson correlation was conducted, this time including the two target items. 
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Again, there was a moderate, positive, significant correlation between confidence and accuracy 
with the target items, r = .398, p < .001. Both with and without the target items, high confidence 
tends to predict accuracy, while low confidence tends to predict inaccuracy. This CA relationship 
for crime details is comparatively similar in magnitude to those reported the eyewitness 
identification literature (see Wixted & Wells, 2017). 
 Target items. Accuracy on the target questions was coded dichotomously so answers 
were either accuracy or inaccurate. To assess whether confidence is a predictor of accuracy in the 
present study, the CA relationship was assessed two different ways. First, point-biserial 
correlations were conducted on the target items to assess the CA relationship for crime details 
similarly to how it is commonly assessed in the eyewitness identification literature. Second, a 
mixed-effects logistic regression was conducted to account for the overall model and to assess 
the PEI conditions and stimulus conditions in their interactions with confidence as a predictor of 
accuracy.  
Point-biserial correlations for each target item, broken down first by PEI condition and 
then by stimulus condition are presented in Table 1. Overall, there was a moderate, positive, 
significant correlation between eyewitness confidence and accuracy on each target item. This 
correlation tended to erode for participants who were exposed to misinformation. Stimulus 
condition did not seem to impact the CA correlation systematically.  
The mixed-effects logistic regression – analyzing confidence, stimulus condition, PEI 
condition, and respective interactions on accuracy – showed the same pattern of results as the 
point-biserial correlations. Confidence was a significant predictor of accuracy (OR = 1.03, 95% 
CI [1.01, 1.04], p < .001. That is, for every one percent increase in confidence on the target 
items, participants are 1.03 times more likely to be accurate, regardless of PEI and stimulus 
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condition membership. The interaction of PEI condition and confidence was also a significant 
predictor of accuracy (OR = .98, 95% CI [.96, 1.0], p = .046). That is, for participants in the 
misinformation condition, for every one percent increase in confidence, they were .98 times 
more likely to be accurate. In other words, when the misinformation condition is considered, 
there were smaller odds of being accurate as confidence increases. This is in line with the point 
biserial correlations that show a moderate CA correlation in the consistent information condition 
but a weak, non-significant CA correlation in the misinformation condition. Stimulus condition 
and all other interactions were non-significant. 
Detection 
 Previous studies examining the misinformation effect distinguish between those who 
detect the misinformation (“detectors”) compared to those who do not detect the misinformation 
(“non-detectors”). The current study gave participants the opportunity to retrospectively detect 
during the funneled debriefing. The funneled debriefing first gave participants opportunity to 
disclose that they detected the misinformation without prompting. At this first level, three 
participants were coded as detectors. The next level prompted participants to think specifically 
about the memory test. Nine participants were coded as detectors at this level.  
Finally, we told participants the true purpose of the study and asked participants whether 
they thought they received misinformation or consistent information. Here, 53.69% of 
participants thought they had received consistent information and 46.31% thought they had 
received misinformation. Of the participants who did receive misinformation, 58.62% correctly 
responded that they had received misinformation, which is slightly above chance level of 
guessing. Of the participants who received consistent information, 64.84% correctly responded 
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that they had received consistent information. While many participants accurately guessed that 
the study was about memory, very few people were aware of the presence of misinformation.  
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CHAPTER 4: DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 The present study sought to determine whether the stimulus used to expose participants to 
a crime influences subsequent memory for the crime. While two competing hypotheses were 
presented, one that suggested that memory for the video would be better and one that suggested 
that memory for the video would be worse, neither hypothesis was supported. Participants who 
viewed the video did not significantly differ from participants who viewed the slideshow in 
overall memory performance. Participants who saw the slideshow reported remembering 
misinformation at a similar rate to participants who saw the video. Further, participants who 
viewed the video and slideshow did not significantly differ in how accurately they remembered 
other crime details besides the target misinformation items. Moreover, participants in either 
stimulus condition did not significantly differ in the confidence levels they expressed. Finally, 
the CA relationship was not impacted by stimulus condition. Together, these results suggest that 
the two stimuli used do not impact participants’ memories for the crime.  
 Based on the results from Snow and colleagues (2014), one hypothesis posited that 
memory performance would be better for participants who viewed a video compared to a 
slideshow. This rests on the comparative realism present in a video compared to a slideshow – 
the moving picture of the video allows one to see relative size, position, and distance similar to 
how one would see these features in real life. In contrast, the still pictures of a slideshow lack 
these informative features. The data presented in the current study do not follow the same pattern 
as those from Snow et al. (2014), though, suggesting that comparing a video to a slideshow 
operates differently than comparing a real object to a photograph of an object. Perhaps because 
both the video and slideshow were viewed on a computer screen, they both lacked the 
informative features that are present in real life. Therefore, it is possible that a live event may 
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offer this additional information, and therefore differ from the video and slideshow in a pattern 
similar to that found in comparing real objects to photographs and sketches of those objects. 
Future research should explore this question. 
 The research presented does, however, support the findings of Megreya and Burton 
(2008), which showed that memory performance for faces did not differ when the face was 
shown live compared to when the face was shown in a static image. While the present study 
examined memory for objects, not faces, the findings taken together suggest that mode of 
presentation may not impact memory performance. Megreya and Burton do acknowledge that 
they create an ideal circumstance for identification performance in an attempt to establish 
baseline performance through the removal of a retention interval in their study. The present 
study, however, does include a retention interval between viewing and testing, and still did not 
find a difference due to stimulus condition.  
The present study also found a moderate CA relationship for items that were consistent 
with the event, but also found that this relationship eroded in the presence of misinformation. 
This finding is in line with previous work demonstrating that misinformation erodes the CA 
relationship (Loftus, Donders, & Hoffman, 1989). This effect typically occurs because those who 
endorse misinformation report high confidence for inaccurate answers, which is known as the 
“signature pattern” of the misinformation effect (Higham, Blank, & Luna, 2017). In the present 
study, this signature pattern emerged for the coat color question but not significantly for the 
stolen item question. For the coat color question, participants who were given misinformation 
were significantly more confident in their answers than participants given consistent information, 
regardless of which answer they chose. The pattern was not consistent for the stolen item 
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question, though, showing that participants who answered correctly that a wallet was stolen were 
significantly more confident than participants who answered incorrectly.  
This difference may be due to the centrality of the stolen item to the plot of the event, in 
comparison to the color of the coat. Because there were three perpetrators and one victim 
amongst a variety of bystanders, the color of clothing items may not be as distinct in 
participants’ memories. However, only one item was stolen, and the item being stolen was a 
central part of the event. Therefore, it was harder to mislead participants about this item. In fact, 
this is demonstrated by the difference in misinformation endorsement between the items. As seen 
in Figures 1a and 1b, at least some participants in each condition chose the misinformation item 
for the coat color question. In contrast, only 2% of participants in the consistent information 
condition endorsed the misinformation for the stolen item question.  
 While previous studies on the misinformation effect have examined detectors compared 
to non-detectors, the present study did not find enough detectors at the first level of detection to 
accurately examine this distinction. When prompted to guess whether they received 
misinformation or consistent information, participants were only slightly above chance at 
guessing that they received misinformation. Clearly, while many participants accurately guessed 
that the study was about memory, very few people were aware of the presence of 
misinformation. 
Limitations and Future Directions  
 One limitation to this study is that it uses participants who receive consistent information 
as the control group, rather than participants who receive no information. The typical 
misinformation paradigm gives participants in the control group no information (Tousignant, 
Hall, & Loftus, 1986). This discrepancy between a “consistent information” control group and a 
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“no information” control group is important because we can therefore not distinguish whether 
memory is impaired by the misinformation or improved by the consistent information. Previous 
research has shown that both processes occur (Chan, Thomas, & Bulevich, 2009; Loftus, Miller, 
& Burns, 1978). However, the focus of the present study is to compare across stimulus 
conditions, for which the contrast between misinformation and consistent information is held 
constant. Thus, the comparison in the magnitude of misinformation endorsement between the 
slideshow and video conditions is the key result, rather than the comparison of misinformation to 
consistent information. In verification of the results found, the present study found a rate of 
misinformation endorsement comparable to that of previous misinformation studies (Blank & 
Launay, 2014; Loftus, 2005). 
Further, in previous studies, the rate of misinformation endorsement was not significantly 
different between consistent information and no information conditions; rather, the rate of 
correct answers differ between these conditions. Moreover, the differences between these 
conditions occur particularly when participants are questioned after a delay (Loftus et al., 1978). 
Because the current study occurred within a short period of time (approximately 30 minutes), 
this issue is still present but less concerning. While these findings suggest that the distinction 
between a consistent information control group and a no information control group do not impair 
the results in the current study, future research should examine this issue in the present context.  
Another limitation of the present study is that it only compares two materials which are 
both computer-based. While a video, as compared to a slideshow, better approximates a real-
world scenario because of the moving picture, participants are still viewing the event on a 
computer screen rather than in the real world. Future directions of this study include comparing 
these computer-based stimuli to a live simulated crime. This distinction is important because it 
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will allow the comparison of a real-world, three-dimensional experience of the crime as 
compared to these two-dimensional versions.  
Conclusion 
This study is of the first to directly compare the misinformation paradigm across research 
materials used to show participants the target event. The use of pallid materials, such as 
slideshows, in eyewitness research is often criticized in its lack of realism and applicability to the 
real-world eyewitness scenario. The present study compared the use of a slideshow to the use of 
a video – a more realistic representation of real-world processes.  
The present study showed that misinformation endorsement, overall accuracy, overall 
confidence, and the CA relationship did not significantly differ depending on which stimulus 
participants viewed. The results presented provide support for the large body of research that has 
relied on slideshows to demonstrate the misinformation effect, suggesting that the results of these 
previous studies are not biased by the materials used. 
Because the purpose of many eyewitness studies is to capture a real-world phenomenon, 
the choice of ecologically valid materials is vital. The current study is a step toward systematic 
investigation of the influence of materials used in eyewitness research. There are many important 
future directions to extend the research presented. Of these, the comparison of these computer-
based stimuli to a live, in-person simulated event is critical to fully address the discussed 
criticism of many eyewitness studies. Further, with advents like virtual reality goggles, the 
possibilities for feasible yet ecologically valid research become more attainable, and future 
research should explore these avenues.  
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Figure 1a. Percent of participants who endorsed the misinformation item “Red Coat,” broken 
down by PEI condition and stimulus condition. 
 
 
Figure 1b. Percent of participants who endorsed the misinformation item “Camera,” broken 
down by PEI condition and stimulus condition. 
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Figure 2. Average accuracy across the memory test, excluding the two target questions. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Average confidence for answers on the memory test, shown with the target (PEI) items 
and without the target items.  
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Figure 4a. Confidence for the coat color question broken down by the answer on the question 
and PEI condition. Confidence levels marked with ** are significant at the .01 alpha level. 
 
 
  
Figure 4b. Confidence for the stolen item question broken down by the answer on the question 
and PEI condition. 
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Table 1  
 
Point-biserial Correlations Between Confidence and Accuracy on Each Target Item  
                          Target Items  
 Coat Color Stolen Item 
 
PEI Condition 
 
 
 
 
Misinformation 
 
.0741 .1483 
Consistent Information .2927*** .3493*** 
   
Stimulus Condition   
 
Slideshow 
 
 
.0233 
 
.2748** 
Video .2036* .2433** 
   
 Note. Correlations marked with *, **, or *** are significant at the .05, .01 or .001 alpha level, 
respectively. 
